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Abstract

This thesis responds to the questions "With the empirical, 'found' world prevalent as the
paradigm for all valid knowledge, what happened to the relevance of the human in knowledge?
Is there an alternative that does not divorce the knower from the knowing?" The ideas of
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984), two thinkers traditionally
viewed as rivals in continental philosophy and social theory, animate these questions. Both
philosophers critique the taken-for-granted aspects of the world: Husserl through the constituting
subject and Foucault through the socially, linguistically, and historically constituted subject.
Rather than an either-or that oversimplifies the subject, a dialogue and a symbiosis between these
two thinkers point to the foundation of an active, meaning-endowing subject in which this
subject is enmeshed in intersubjective power relations and in which certain knowledges are
subjugated to others. Through a combined critique, it is possible to continue an investigation
beyond a discursive level, to desediment more layers ofknowledge, and to continue to critique
the always-already there in order to understand enduring constitutions and the subject's
becoming.
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Scientia et Sapaentia Knowledge and Wisdom. The herald ofintellectual inquiry that
presides over Illinois Wesleyan. In the spirit ofthis intellectual tradition, I continue:

We have learned and continue to learn great things from the methods we have used and
continue to use in sociology. From controversial studies such as Laud Humphreys's Tearoom
Trade] to the less notorious studies such as Stewart Lockie et al's study on organic food
consumption,2 our sociological methodology has taught us a great deal about social interaction,
socialization, social norms, and other social factors. But something is missing. That something?
A focus on the concrete subject qua subject qua agent qua human being. Perhaps this missing
piece is due to the fact that we have gone about studying social interaction in a way that relies
heavily on the notion of a "found" world with certain empirical rules, a notion that divorces the
knower from the knowing. In an academic setting in which empirical methods of statistical facts
and natural laws and a belief in the existence of a "found" world (in a word, positivism) govern,
not just in sociology, but also in the general way in which academia is "done," I find myself
asking: What happened to the relevance of the human in knowledge and wisdom? Is there an
alternative to positivism in presenting a critique? A critique that does not rely on a strategy that
uncritically posits positive, objective, "found" knowledge as the paradigm for all valid
knowledge? And what might we find if we turn back to the human, the agent, the subject?
This thesis is my response to the above questions, questions that a rivalry in social theory
and continental philosophy animates: that between the ideas of Edmund Husserl and Michel
Foucault. Both Husserl and Foucault critique the taken-for-granted aspects of the world around

] Laud Humphrey. Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places. 1970.
2 Lockie, Stewart, et al. "Eating 'Green': Motivations Behind Organic Food Consumption in
Australia." 2002.
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us and what we perceive as always-already there: Husserl through the constituting subject and
Foucault through the socially, linguistically, and historically constituted discursive subject?
Differing versions of the subject in Foucauldian post-structuralism and in Husserlian
transcendental phenomenology are, however, traditionally viewed as opposing each other-the
4

subject is either one or the other. This rivalry, however, rests on an oversimplification of the
subject that singularizes, compartmentalizes, and restricts the plurality of the subject's world. 5 It
does not allow for the complexity of what it means for the human to be in the world, of the
world, and experiencing and knowing the world. In response to this simplification, I move for a
new sociological methodology: a move for a return to human that focuses on the subject's

3 Another possible way of explaining this concept of constituted subject is Zach Summers's term
being-in-society (93), an extension ofSartre's being in relation to others which emphasizes how
this being is given its meaning through the governing structures and rules of the social body.
Similarly, Martin Jay in Downcast Eyes provides an explanation of the role of the gaze in
constituting the subject: "The non-reciprocity between the look and the eye, between being the
subject and the object of the gaze, is in fact related to a fundamental struggle for power. For the
one who casts the look is always subject and the one who is its target is always turned into an
object... self is constituted by the gaze of the other: 'L'autre me voit, donc je suis' [The other
sees me, therefore lam]" (288). While these examples expand more on the concept of
constituted subject, I contend, as Summers does in his project of grounded ethics, that these
Sartrean notions need a Foucauldian understanding of sociopolitical relations to further explain
the relationships between the subject and other~ (emphasis on plurality of others) rather than just
the Other (singular).
4 William Schroeder, p 621-622; Serge Valdinoci, p. 73 and 100; Bernard Charles Flynn, p. 228.
5 Perhaps one of the clearest examples of rigidity in constituting versus constituted subject is that
of identity. For the constituting subject, an individual only knows within the scope of his or her
race, sex, culture, etc. and can only extend that knowledge politically within that particular
realm. This argument for a constituting subject in identity is detrimental in that it leads to the
categorizing and compartmentalization of who can and cannot know and, thus, who can or
cannot "legitimately" act. For example, only women can understand sexism and thus are the only
ones who know enough to battle sexism. OR, for the constituted subject, an individual only
knows because s/he is given and formed within a certain sociopolitical framework from which to
work. For example, the fact of my woman-ness and what I am permitted to do as woman comes
from a discursive struggle over a gender binary as well as what is deemed natural or unnatural
for me to do. This constituted subject in identity is detrimental in that in leads to a resignation to
linguistic and cultural relativism. The opposition within the inquiry into identity is causal and
unambiguous. There is a defmitive end and a defmitive beginning point.

2
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agency while not forgetting the sociopolitical forces at play. While Henry Rubin 6 and David
Fryer7 also contend that phenomenology and post-structuralism are compatible, I will use the
conflict between phenomenology and post-structuralism to pose a new method of understanding
the subject. Widening and furthering their projects, not resolving one thinker into the other,
produces a new methodology that seeks to put the agency back into the human while allowing
for social and historical factors that affect her constituting. This new methodology is a return to
the self that underscores the importance of the individual agency and that does not deny the
demands, structures, and relations of the world around. It is an acknowledgement of the
complexity of the world, a complexity beyond wildest imagination and a focus on how we are
concretely in the world. A symbiosis that retains Foucault's and Husserl's dynamism, this new
methodology of becoming takes into account the formation of a subject while not divorcing the
knower from the knowing.

Husserlian Transcendental Phenomenology: Away from Nai've Objectivism, Toward
Transcendental Subjectivity and Intended Consciousness
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was a German mathematician and philosopher whose
project focused on bringing what is implicit and viewed as common sense in the world to a
reflective place. Husserl's The Crisis ojEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
(1936) continues from Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (1931). In

Rubin compares Sartre and Foucault to claim that phenomenology and post-structuralism are
compatible, but his explanation of Sartre's levels of bodily ontology to understand trans
gendered identities is more akin to Husserl's constituting, meaning-endowing subject, and hence
the reason for using Husserl rather than Sartre in my comparison.
7 While Fryer ("Toward a Phenomenology of Gender...") uses Foucault and Husserl together to
push for a Husserlian methodology of gender, I will expand Foucault and Husserl in relation to
the subject in general rather than Foucault and Husser1 in relation to sex and gender.
6
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both of these books, Husserl describes his project of transcendental phenomenology as a
response to science's unquestioned reliance on positivistic proof and belief in uncovering the socalled truth through uncovering the supposedly independently existing objective world. This type
of phenomenology focuses on the transcendental conditions that underlie human experience,
including the experience of worldliness itself and what makes experience possible.
The transcendental condition is consciousness. This consciousness is not the opposite of
subconsciousness or of unconsciousness. Consciousness is the source for phenomena and for our
making sense of the world, of giving it shape and meaning-in whatever shape it takes and in
whatever way we go about it. 8 Husserl states, "[W]e are subjects for this world... experiencing it,
contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully; for us this surrounding world has only the
ontic meaning given to it by our experiencings, our thoughts, our valuations, etc.,,9 In simplest
terms, what we know of the world and of world-ness, we know from our experience ojthe world.
Through the voluntary philosophical stance called the phenomenological reduction- or
epoche-- the phenomenologist 10 arrives at this transcendental level of experience. In the epoche,
the individual brackets what she knows, recognizing the possibility of its not being known. 11 In
enacting the epoche, she calls into question what had been simply accepted as obviousmateriality, causation, value, meaning for others, etc.-in order to shake up stuck, rigid

Thus, the Surrealist questions of what is reality and what do we really see, influences from the
Freudian push for the validity of dreams and the unconscious, are not discredited here, but are
opened up as very real possibilities for meaning-endowing consciousness.
9 Husserl, The Crisis ojEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Crisis), p. 105,
sic.
10 The phenomenologist is any individual enacting the epoche in his/her inquiry.
11 This reduction is not an easily summarized mental technique in which one can follow steps 1-5
and tah-dah! end up at an immediate outcome. Rather, it is a process that requires continuous
reflection.
8
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sediments of knowledges and to expose an individual's uninterrogated accepted claims.

12

From

this bracketing, the world as world and its phenomena as intentional correlates oftranscendental

subjectivity become evident. Phenomena are revealed as meant objects; that is, phenomena are
recognized as signified as object by a subject, as a particular object with a specific meaning as
well as a specific manner in which the object is presented by consciousness. Objects are not
things outside of a subject, her consciousness, constituting them as such.
This constitution is not static. The essence~ of an object or of phenomena are aspects or
qualities of an object as intended. A comment on essence is not a statement on what is an
original or inherent, fixed or metaphysical content of the object that can be uncovered. It is
instead an acknowledgement ofthe malleability of how objects are constituted and the
possibilities of the thing's coming to be as meant: its becoming.
While there are these possibilities of our constitution of world-as-world and objects in the
world, the essences establish certain conditions for the world. Constitution of the world builds
meaning and establishes and organizes meaning in particular ways. For example, we constitute
the world as temporal and spatial. We also distinguish ourselves from others, my ego from your
ego, based on personal space, internal time consciousness, and external points of reference. That
is, there is a sense of own-ness, a sense of "what is specifically peculiar to me as ego, my

concrete being as a monad, purely in myself and for myself," 13 that helps me distinguish me
from you. Yet we experience the world as an intersubjective world, a world in which we are

12

In the epoche, the world is no longer viewed on a straightforward basis. However, as Maurice

Natanson reminds us, "reflecting and living continue, side by side in the life of consciousness"
(Natanson 59). The epoche is not a denial or forgetting ofthe world surrounding the individual
performing the epoche; the phenomenologist remains in the world as much as ever and does not
separate her self from herself.
13 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 94, my emphasis.
5
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aware of others14 experiencing the world and others experiencing us. While others are objects for
me in the world, they are also subjects for the world, that is, egos intending the world-as-world
and the objects in it. This awareness of others constituting the world is a recognition of a
"community of monads," of me as monad and others as monads intending the world. 15 With this
acknowledgement of the universalityl6 of constitution and intended consciousness, there is also
an acknowledgement of an intersubjective constitution of an object: what exists for me, also
exists for you. We constitute more than just the existence of objects. We also constitute objects
as having multiple sides that change shape based on our vantage point of the object; these
retentive and protentive horizons, the approach and recession of objects based on a change in
time and vantage point, come with our encounter with the world-as-world. A subject's
recognition of ownness, intersubjectivity, protentive and retentive horizons, and a space-time
dimension points to an intentional process that is not chaotic. 17 There are certain invariant
structures ofthe life-world, then, that we use to make sense ofthe world of objects; we cannot
choose as if we could constitute otherwise.
In ''whatever way we may be conscious ofthe world," our consciousness is directed.

18

Husserl refers to this directedness as intentionality.19,20 Perceptions point to something,
regardless ofhow, why or what they point to. Thinking is always thinking of something. Willing
is a willing of something. Imagining is imagining something. Dreaming is dreaming of

14 That is, other than me, alien to me, not-me.
IS Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.
16 This universality is not a metaphysical claim. It is, instead, part of the explanation of the
intentional components implicit in the experienced and experiential world that exists for us.
17 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 54
18 Husserl, Crisis, p.l08.
19 This intension is not a statement on motivation for action, but a statement on action having a
correlate, a target.
20 Husserl refers to this intended object and intended world as noema and the intentional act as
noesis. The noesis is understood in its active relation to the noema.

6
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something. The way in which we know that the world is real is by intending it as real. The notion
of our intending consciousness underscores that an individual is action: a dynamic force that
gives objects their object-ness and makes sense of the world as world and of its phenomena. As
Husserl states, "[I]t is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interest; with
them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are 'thematic' objects.',2l These
objects have a meaning because we intend them as such; they are meant objects.
This intended-meaning radically breaks with the prejudices of the so-called objective
sciences. Positive science's understanding ofthe world comes from the notion that the world is
there, with its natural laws and uniform ways of behaving that are waiting to be uncovered and,
once discovered, easily predicted. This belief of the world-as-found emphasizes the world's a
priori existence, an existence outside of the individual, the discoverer, as well as the selfs
passive receptivity to this already existing world. Husserl calls this belief in the underlying
persistence ofthe world distinct from consciousness the natural attitude?2
Transcendental consciousness calls into question the natural attitude and its unexpressed
presupposition of the surrounding world as taken for granted as valid and as existing before and
outside of the individual. As Husserl contends, "[T]he objective-scientific method rests upon a
never questioned, deeply concealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation will for
the first time reveal the true meaning of the accomplishments of positive science and,
correlatively the true ontic meaning ofthe object world-precisely as a transcendental-subjective
meaning.,,23 Thus, positivism is entrenched in naive objectivity.24 By naive, Husserl means that
an individual relies unreflectively on an empirically real world. Facts and figures equal Truth.

21 Husserl,
22 Husserl,
23 Husserl,
24 Husserl,

Crisis, p.
Crisis, p.
Crisis, p.
Crisis, p.

108.
143.
100.
143.
7
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Husserl's comment on the naIvete of objectivism is not a comment on objectivism's findings as
right or wrong, but it is a statement that objectivism is misguided: objectivism overlooks itself as
an achievement of intersubjective, intending consciousness. Husserl's view, however, is not antiscience or a denial of the positive existence of the real. Rather, it is a challenge to how science is
done. As Natanson notes, phenomenology does not "deny or relinquish the empirical but fastens
on it as intentional object.,,25 Meaning of the world and its ability to be an a priori given comes
from the ways in which the world has been intended. As Husserl describes it, objective science is
"an accomplishment remaining within subjectivity.,,26 Objectivity from and for subjectivity:
Objectivity is a product of the acting, intending individual. Its object-ness and the notion of
unbiased neutrality in a positivistic approach comes from the subject intending it as object with
said features and with said means of analysis. The phenomenological interest in the object is not
an interest on its appearance or its realness, but it is an interest because of what is intended and
how consciousness constitutes. Rather than facts and figures of science's positivism,
phenomenology offers a new foundation for inquiry and for objectivity. This "new ground" is the
ground of a subject's intending and constituting consciousness?7
Remember, though, one's consciousness is not an isolated consciousness. In recognizing
intersubjectivity at the transcendental level and constitution of objects as there for everyone,
there is a recognition of other individuals being in the world-as-world. Husserl's subjectivism is
neither a solipsism nor a relativism. However, Husserl's project does not offer an explanation,
however, of these intersubjective relations at a social or discursive level. Additionally, his
exposition and critique of naIve objectivity remains only at either the transcendental or the broad

25 Natanson, p. 185.
26 Husserl, Crisis, p. 95.
27 Husserl, Crisis, p. 100.

8

•

historical (e.g. Husserl's discussion of Galileo's mathematization of nature) level. While Husserl
explains this history as a movement or as an evolution, the individual is not described in history
nor in relation to the political nor with a concept of power or of politics.
Enter Foucault. Foucault's genealogical period offers an analysis of social and power
relations that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology does not, an explanation that grounds
individuals in the sociopolitical world and further reveals and destabilizes sedimented
knowledges and that helps elucidate what to call into question about ourselves in the epoche.

Foucauldian Post-Structuralism: Describing the Human in Relation to and Within
Social Totalities
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was a French social historian and philosopher who
interrogated what is taken for granted as known and, in the process, shakes up the present order
of every day situations, scientific, linguistic, historic and academic frameworks of thought, and
individuals' beliefs in these theories and concepts of how the world operates. Scholars
traditionally divide his work into two periods: his archeological period and his genealogical
period. In the first period, Foucault looked at the shifts in epistemes and what makes these shifts
and knowledge possible, while in the latter he was occupied with lineage and development of
these discourses in their relation to power and truth. There is also a third section in his later
works that is less often focused on in secondary literature, but which I contend is highly
significant: his tum to the active subject.

9

Archaeology
Foucault's archaeological period is a dig beneath the surface of everyday knowledge
about how certain disciplines work.

28

In his major archeological work, The Order o/Things

(1966), Foucault describes his archaeological move as an inquiry into the conditions of
knowledge, what makes knowledge possible, in order to understand the changes in epistemes
systems of knowledge or discourses on a particular topic. Tracking the evolutions in linguistics,
economics, and biology, Foucault describes how discursive change is "an event in the order of
knowledge.,,29 As these disciplines gain more knowledge about their particular topic, there are
shifts in rules about ordering, logic, and representation that couple, uncouple, and re-couple
different knowledges. Rather than a body of knowledge, a seemingly smooth, continuous and
''unified epistemological field" within the discipline, there are, Foucault says, many
discontinuities- a movement in which interests were modified, shifted, and redistributed and
different discursive regimes arose.

30

These changes are "wrinkles traced for the first time upon

the enlightened face of knowledge" in this archaeological dig.

31

In the process of these breaks

and reconnections of knowledge, these changes establish a hierarchy for what is more real, more
necessary, and/or more true. This concentration on broad movements within disciplines in order
to show discursive shifts and (re)ordering puts forth the notion: order within disciplines is open
to change, and if change is "an event in the order of knowledge," then knowledge is also open to
change. Foucault's archaeological period, thus, focused on epistemes, not on the individual or

28 This period traditionally includes his large works Madness and Civilization (1961), The Birth
o{the Clinic (1963), The Order o/Things (1966), and The Archaeology o/Knowledge (1969).
2 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 345.
30 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 246.
31 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 238.
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the specific dynamics within or between these epistemes, in order to show the uninterrogated
disruptions in knowledge and order that make possible our knowledge of these disciplines.

Genealogy: Discipline

But what is the motivation for these discursive changes? Foucault addresses this question
in his later works, in his genealogical period,32 while also continuing his archaeological inquiry
into conditions for knowledge and discourse. Discourses are the foundation of society: society,
objects and the idea of an individual are all subjected products of these discourses. As Foucault
has already shown, they come into being through discourse, rather than preceding discourse. But
there is more to just naming the multiplicity of discourses. Foucault now realizes the
impossibility of neutrality within discourses and their functions is the catalyst for Foucault's
genealogical shift. Foucault uses the creation and evolution of specific knowledge§ and
rationalities to map and critique historical conflicts within discourses and to critique established
authorities and knowledges. In this genealogical tum, Foucault establishes that there is a
dynamic of power and will to truth that drives these knowledges and formations of discourse
foundational to society.
Rather than describing power as binaries of the ruler-ruled or of oppressor-oppressed or
affirming theories of power as jurisprudence, sovereignty, right, or economics, Foucault's
analysis establishes power as a "complex strategical situation" in society.33 A web of
interconnecting, fluid forces that go over-around-and-through society, power is everywhere. It is
an immanent force "not because it embraces everything but because it comes from

32 This period traditionally includes his large works, The Order ofDiscourse (1970), Discipline
and Punish (1975) and The History ofSexuality, Volume 1 (1976). It also includes the interview
"Truth and Power" that Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino conducted (1976).
33 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 93.
11
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everywhere.,,34 To look for different centers of power is impossible. Power exists in relations, in
its exercise. From this relational attribute of power, it becomes clear that there are necessary
interactions between individuals. The infinite and minute interactions, social relations, are built
up to form what we know as society. Power is rooted in this social nexus. But power is not an
institutional structure or personal strength, nor can it be acquired or seized. Power does not result
from the direct choice of the individual. Instead, power is a relational and productive force based
on discursive definitions, definitions with their own aims and truths. Thus, power is not
something that one "has" or "possesses." Rather, it is the name for a dynamic that occurs
between and among agents, be they individuals, institutions, or states.
One of the ways in which mechanisms of power function is by individuating subjects in
immediate, everyday life. As Foucault writes, this form of power "categorizes the individual,
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on
him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him.,,35 Power makes
individuals subjects. It is also a form of power that has a link with a discursive truth about a
subject and a discursive desire and motivation, a will, to need a truth.
Foucault analyzes the Panopticon inDiscipline and Punish (1975) in order to illustrate
how discursive practices operate and how power disciplines and shapes the individual. Replacing
the previous techniques of torture and punishment, the Panopticon is a discipline structure, a
prison structure with tiered, singular cells surrounding a central guard tower. In the Panopticon,
the guard can see into the cells, but the prisoner cannot see into the tower. In this method, the

34 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 93.
35 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 781. While this quote crosses from the active
subjectivity to the genealogical period of his works, it is an apt description of his genealogical
description ofthe subject in relation to power. It also shows how genealogical imperatives
continue in his move to active subjectivity.
12

crowd of inmates is easily numbered and categorized. As Foucault states, "Invisibility is a
guarantee of order',36: the permanent possibility of being watched, of being seen doing something
slhe is not supposed to, keeps the prisoner's behavior in line. Slhe becomes the gaze, and in the
process, slhe subjects hislherselfto this unverifiable control without direct force. Privileges are
given for "good" behavior, a controlled conduct that conforms to the ideals of what a prisoner
should be in hislher process ofreform to become a "functional" citizen. By internalizing what a
"proper" citizen is, slhe disciplines hislherselfto a mode of behavior. No longer is the authority
a single executioner on a public scaffold who inflicts bodily pain, but now the authority is an
automated mechanism, which includes the individual, that restricts bodily movement while also
prescribing a regimen for the non-corporal truths-drives, aptitudes, potentialities-of the
person. In this way, the Panopticon enacts and enforces discipline-not only by disciplining the
individual directly, but also by teaching the individual to discipline herself.
Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon is not simply an analysis of the prison. It is also an
analysis of the modem individual and the society that shapes her. The methods of the Panopticon
filter into the modes of society and its lateral controls because ofthe inescapable, allencompassing discourses- a variety of disciplines, each with a unique know-how about the
behavior and capacity that it assigns to an individua1. 37 Within the discourses, Foucaul explains,
"the formation of knowledge and the increase ofpower regularly reinforce one another in a
circular process.,,38 Discourses create a rigid knowledge of the subject in categorizing and
defining the topic of discussion-the criteria of the supposed to be in how the topic is organized
and the individual is identified. The subtle utilization of knowledge about the individual codifies

36 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 200.
37 While it is important to note that the Panoptic scheme is not the only way in which procedures
of power operate in society, it does explain productive power in social relations.
38 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 224.
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what is nonnal and natural. Discourses separate out the multiplicity, characterizing and
classifying individuals around a discourse-defined truth, qualifying and ranking individuals on
how close they fit the presupposed nonn. The more an individual confonns, the more s/he aligns
with "his [or her] 'true' name, 'true' place.,,39 This sorting is permanent in that it is always
present, but malleable in that its fonn changes from institution to institution and discourse to
discourse. The institutions' central hub of ideals-their guard tower- are open to confonning
individuals to inspect and to obtain a view from this point of inspection. Individuals presume that
this access is democratically accessible rather than seeing the tyranny of this technique because
of the process of nonnalization.
This nonnative process is a product of individuals unwittingly subjecting and disciplining
themselves to different discursive ideals. The prospect of someone seeing him/her counter the
prescribed notion, not the punishment itself, becomes the method of surveillance. This mode
keeps an individual in compliance before s/he ever acts contrary to the nonn. Eventually, a code
of nonnalcy, a codified truth about the subject, develops; individuals have a standard to measure
themselves against. Through comparison and nonnalization rather than punishment and law, this
mode of power gains its authority. These discourse-detennined nonns are then believed to be
natural for oneself and for others-their existence, evolution, and construction become invisible.
This fonn of discipline is pervasive: it extends across modern society. As Foucault pointedly
remarks,
Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labor, its
authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in nonnality, who continue and
multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of
penalty? Is it surprising that Frisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals,
which all resemble prisons?4

39 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 198.
40 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 227-228.
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Genealogy: Power-Knowledge
Recall that this pervasiveness is due to internalization of the nonn. This acceptance of the
nonn as natural and already there subjects behavior-thought and action-to the nonn and gives
power to this knowledge, fonning what Foucault calls the dyad "power-knowledge." In the
power-knowledge dyad of discourse, Foucault explains, "the speaking subject is also the subject
ofthe statement.,,41 Slhe is the topic of discussion and a particular discourse directs what slhe
can or cannot say or do. There are certain prescriptive rules and discourse-defined truths in
which she operates. Her subjectivity: Slhe is subjected to discourse as well as a subject of
discourse. With the increase of discursive know-how and nonnalization, concepts of a topic
become rigidified, stuck to a particular time, age, ethnicity, gender, class, etc. The construction
of the nonn as well as the role of knowledge and power relations are invisible. They are
perceived as given, as already-there. Acting in accordance with these veiled ideals, individuals
acquire another mode of subjection, another mode of subjectivity.
This discursive making of subjects is a fonn, or technique, of power. Rather than a
universal fonn or passive object that can be possessed or exchanged, power is a productive force
that functions in multiple ways and in multiple relations between and among individual subjects,
institutions, systems, and discourses. There is a mechanism of power that is located and
produced through the minute and even mundane interrelations within society and woven into
discourse. The exercise of power is rooted in this social nexus, not reconstituted above or outside
of these systems and discourses. Power acts upon actions; this emphasis on the action in power
means that there is a perpetual possibility of reversal. Discourses and techniques of power within
them are malleable, not fixed.

41 Foucault, The History ofSexuality, p. 61.
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Discourses and the techniques of power within them are thus dynamic. As Foucault
reminds us, "Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution.,,42 There is more
than one objective in each strategy as well as more than one strategy in each objective.
Regardless of technique or its dispersion, the strategy is not homogeneous on all social levels.
For example, the discourse that proclaims sex as reproductive has different imperatives for race,
class, gender, sexual orientation and age.
In noting this multiplicity and dynamism, Foucault challenges a discourse's mentality of
discovering a transcendental Truth and achieving Rationality. Instead, he asserts, there are many

rationalities because there are many discourses and techniques within discourses. He contends
that the word 'rationalization' is dangerous and what is needed is an analysis of "specific
rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalization in general.,,43 Because of
power-truth interplay, certain knowledges have been lost, discredited, buried or rejected. Due to
this subjected knowledge, there must be a focus on local, specific, and immediate knowledges
and their infinite mechanisms of power and its effects.
Foucault places the subject in relation to power. The individual is the most immediate site
that power relations have their effect. Power relationships are rooted in the social nexus. This
model of power centers itself on the individual and operates through an intricate interplay of
power and truth. The analysis ofpower looks at how subjects are gradually constituted through
discourse and the power-truth mechanisms within them. The individual is the subject to and of
discourse, an effect of power. This productive power conceptualizes power as a force within
social relations and a force predicated on knowledge of the subject, the formation of what it

42 Foucault, The History a/Sexuality, p. 99
43 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 779-780. This quote is appropriate here in genealogy
even ifit crosses the genealogical-subjectivity split of Foucault's periods.
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means to be a subject as well as being subjected to this knowledge. By focusing on the
productions and techniques of power, it is apparent that the analysis of power "cannot take place
simply at the level of ideological abstraction, but instead must view the concrete and myriad
mechanisms through which power operates.,,44 Ideals are grounded in socially-created
perceptions and their political push-pull.
The genealogical period, then, focused on discipline and power-knowledge in order to
show not only discursive shifts, like his archeological period's focus, but also the lack of
neutrality in these shifts. Power is an underlying dynamic that arises from social interaction, a
force that individuates and nonnalizes in order to discipline individuals and to teach individuals
how to discipline themselves to certain discursively defined nonns. Through the increase of
subjection ofthought and action to a particular nonn, power is given to this knowledge at the
expense of other knowledges.

Active Subjectivity
You will recall that in his archeological period, Foucault's focus was on epistemes, while
in the genealogical period his focus was on power, knowledge, and discourses. By the end of the
genealogical period, however, Foucault finds himself talking more and more about the individual
qua agent. There is a move within and after Foucault's genealogical work toward a focus on the
individual's agency that addresses these questions: Who or what is enacting these power
relations and putting discourse into action? Who or what is internalizing these nonns in order for
them to become invisible and viewed as already-there? As Foucault "clarifies,,45 in "The Subject

44 Summers, p. 26, my italics.
45 But is it really a "clarification"? Or is he just back peddling to save his project? While I will
leave this question to you as the reader to decide, I think it is important to note his adamant
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and Power," the aim of his works is not discourse nor power, "but the subject which is the
general theme" of his research. 46 Foucault realizes that he reaches a barrier in genealogy because
of his inattention to the subject qua agent. Rather than insisting on discourses as existing as
separate entities apart from the subject, he reforms his genealogical critique to include
individuals enacting and engaging in power relations and challenging discourses. The individual
is no longer discourse's marionette. The active agent that does more than just passively receive
these discourses, be a discursive subject, or be subjected to discourse by discourse. She has an
active role-an active subjectivity.47
In noting this always-present characteristic of discourses, Foucault claims that individuals
can and need to challenge these discourses in order to mobilize a response to suffocating
discourses. Instead of unquestioningly aligning to a certain discourse, a "critical interrogation on
the present and on ourselves" is possible.48 Awareness ofpower relations and discourses enables
an individual to counter the authority that claims knowledge; to understand the historical
struggles through which these power relations that constitute her individuality have come to
exist; and to recognize her inter-enmeshment and function in power relations. Foucault
challenges: Envision new ways of being individuals. Individuals must call into question the very
basic power relations that form the foundation of the social nexus and strive to analyze what is
below the surface of everyday "rationality"-the motivations, the power struggles and the
history of the local knowledge-while understanding that there is never "access to any complete

aversion to the subject in his archaeological period and his introduction of the subject in his later
works and his insistence here in "The Subject of Power" that the subject is and has always been
his main theme.
46 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 778.
47 His large works The History ofSexuality, Vol. 2-3 (1984) and his later essays, including
"What is Enlightenment?," "The Subject and Power," "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a
Practice of Freedom," and "Subjectivity and Truth" are included in this period.
48 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 132.
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or definite knowledge..." of an individual's capacities, hislher role in society, the social
institutions, and the ultimate function of society.49 Individuals cannot know what type of
situations will arise or when they will occur. No comprehensive cure-all can be guaranteed. An
individual can only open her eyes as much as possible to the panopticism that surrounds her and
push against her limits towards ''undefined work of freedom.,,50 In order to open up spaces for an
unspecified, undefined freedom, slhe can only squirm to create twist-and-shout latitude within
old discourses, taking each situation separately and realizing that what works today in a
particular situation may not work tomorrow. Although discourses categorize the world, it is
possible to challenge existing discourses and create spaces for personal liberation albeit still

within a discourse and power relations. Discourses confine, but they also free.

Foucault and Husserl: A Productive Crisis Towards a Complex, Active Subject
Grounded in the Sociopolitical
The Turn to the Active Subject
While the subject tries to work to find latitude in discourses for her undefined work of
freedom, Foucault's explanation ofthe subject in relation to the discursive power-knowledge
truth trio gives the individual a passive dimension in which slhe receives an already-there
discourse in which slhe is already enmeshed. As Beatrice Han explains, the Foucauldian analysis
of subjectivity "appears to oscillate in a contradictory manner, between a definition of
subjectivity as 'self-creation,' on the one hand, and on the other hand, the need, in order to
understand the games of truth through which recognition itself operates, back to the practices of

49 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 127.
50 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" p. 126.
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power of which subjects are not masters and are usually not even aware.,,51 This tension points to
a lack of foundation-while trying to historicize the subject in order to show that Husserl's
transcendental intended consciousness was not so transcendental after all, Foucault fell back on
an active subject.
Foucault's tum to the active subject is important to note because of its large break with
his previous writings and critiques of phenomenology's subject. In his archeological work,
Foucault critiques Hussed for being too transcendental and for trying to get to an a priori origin
while also not recognizing phenomenology as a discourse. In The Order o/Things, Foucault
writes that phenomenology raises "the ground of experience, the sense of being, the lived
horizon of all our knowledge to the level of our discourse.,,52 Phenomenology is unreflective
about its discursive location, and it does not take into account its historical and political situation.
Later on in his works, Foucault further critiques the notion of a constituting subject. As Foucault
writes in one of his genealogical interviews, "Truth and Power" (1976):
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to
say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a
historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history
which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects,
etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in
relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of
history.53
For Foucault, the idea of a constituting subject either separates the subject from historical
political dimensions or neglects the many ways in which notions of the subject are discursively
developed.

51 Han, p. 172.
52 Foucault, The Order o/Things, p. 299.
53 Foucault, "Truth and Power," p. 117.
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Foucault, however, misreads the meaning of origin, history, and constituting subject in
Husserl. While the intended consciousness of the subject is a foundation, the origin for Husserl
does not point to the genesis of History nor does it prescribe a fixed mode of being or a specific
prescriptive "supposed to" of doing, acting, or being for the subject. Intended consciousness,
instead, describes how we make sense of the world, where all notions of even the world-as-world
arise. Given the intended quality of consciousness there is not an "empty sameness"; there is
always something that consciousness is directed towards, and it is not always the same
something. Likewise, even though pointing to certain invariant structures in the life-world,
constitution of a meant world is not static: it is a very dynamic process, a process in which an
ego is continually making and giving sense to the world. This fashioning is a cultural and
historical process but the subject is still the contributing agent. 54 Knowledge of the subject does
not precede discourse. But the subject puts the discourse and its political dimensions in motion.
Foucault's move to the active subject acknowledges that the subject is the mover and
shaker in discourse. This shift, however, occurred at the end of his philosophical career. Soon
after his turn to the active subject, he died, and there is not a clear indication of the direction that
he would take this subject. While it is speculation that Foucault would eventually have moved to
a more Husserlian phenomenology of the subject, his move to the subject does point to
Foucault's realization that even if we are constituted, we do have a "why" in seeking an
''undefined work of freedom." Otherwise, what point would there be to our focus on local
struggles? There is a need for a subject who is acting and constituting subject rather than one
who is simply constituted in understanding power, discourse, local knowledges, and making
sense of the world.

54

Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 133.
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Not only will an active subject offer insight into the ''undefined work of freedom" and an
interrogation into local struggles, the active subject also prevents masking subjugated
knowledges. In relying strictly on a constituted subject, Foucault hides subjugated knowledges
he seeks to uncover. As Rubin asserts, Foucault undermines "the authority of individual speaking
subjects and thereby plays into patterns of domination that work against the possibility of
marginalized subjects using their knowledge of their own subject positions to speak counter
discursively.,,55 Without a speaking subject, what is known about a certain topic or about a
particular individual is generalized, subsumed in another discourse, and covered over again
rather than being seen as its own genealogical layer. A focus on an active subject, even if it is
perhaps not exactly the constituting subject that Husserl seeks, permits these submerged
discourses to be voiced and dominant ones to be challenged-to continue Foucault's call to seek
"the undefined work of freedom" and to focus on local knowledges. An active subject points to
the subject as agent in power relations, discourse formations, and normalizing truths.

A New Foundation: Turning to Husserl
Although Foucault encourages an active subject in twist-and-shout lattitude in discourses
and a genealogical approach to local knowledges, he does not give a new foundation. For
Foucault, discourses are permanent- there is no escaping discourse. There is only moving
through the discursive sludge to more discursive gunk. While Husserl does not try to simplify the
mess, HusserI does provide a new foundation that does not fall into the trap of blindly accepting
the already-there that Foucault warns against. There is an acknowledgment that the new
foundation does not have complete access to Knowledge and Wisdom. All knowledge is not to

55 Rubin, p. 264.
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be found in Husserl's writings alone, but Husserl does establish a methodological and analytic
foundation that works in dialogue with other perspectives, 56 such as Foucault's.
Rather than focusing on knowledge separate from the subject, phenomenology insists on
the subject's primacy in the formation of knowledge. It is concerned with how humans know the
world, not for knowledge itself, but for knowing what the world means to us, the world as meant.
Connecting knowledge to the knower, phenomenology inserts the human at the center of
knowing.
Focusing on the centrality of the subject, this new basis for inquiry also gives an
alternative to positive objectivity: objectivity from and for subjectivity. Foucault, too, rejects a
dogmatic belief in the value of scientific knowledge as the only way to acquire knowledge about
something: he inverts the positivist approach that a definable, ultimate truth is possible or that it
can be arrived at through an objective analysis. Rationality becomes rationalities. Knowledge
becomes knowledges. He shows disciplines as lacking scientificity, as positively unscientific, but
he does not critique science's positivism. As Rudi Visker points out, "Foucault can only dispute
the scientific ideal of the human sciences by basing his arguments... on a specific conception of
what constitutes the scientificity of science: the difference between the position of the human and
the other sciences (...) is for Foucault an argument-the only argument-which leads to the
direct conclusion that they are unscientific in character."

57

For Foucault, the human in the

human sciences is not properly studied by scientific standards. But what about these standards?
These standards are not compatible with the multiplicity of knowledges that Foucault reveals for
they endorse the ability to find an origin, an a priori ahistorical Knowledge of how the world
operates that Foucault emphatically rejects. Along with endorsing a genealogical approach that

56
57

Phenomenology Roundtable, p. 1.
Rudi Visker, p. 42.
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unroots the concept of Rationality and Knowledge in tracing discursive changes and in
uncovering subjected knowledges, he needs to put forth an alternative to positivism.
Phenomenology offers this alternative. The notion of objectivity from subjectivity
permits not only a focus on the active subject, but also accounts for the notion of knowledges.
This description of objectivity allows for many concepts of the world-as-meant, meanings given
to the world by the subject as well as what the subject knows of the world. The multiplicity spills
forth.
As part of this active subject-centered methodological alternative to positivism, the
phenomenological task does not dismiss notions of the world nor does it stop investigating these
notions simply because the notions are discursive. As Fryer states, "In its investigation of the
lifeworld, phenomenology also investigates how experiences, even ones that are more properly
discursive products than keys to the transcendental, shape our worldview and experiences of the
world.,,58 While Foucault disrupts notions and points to their discursiveness, he also implicitly
rejects any meaning beyond the fact of their discursiveness and stops his investigation after
illuminating their discursiveness. Husserl, however, focuses on the world-as-meant for the
subject, and in the process, opens up understandings of the world and grounds objective science
in the life-world. Instead of a finite task that ends with the revealing of discursiveness, the
phenomenological method is an infinite task.

More De-Sedimenting: What Foucault Adds
Part of the difficult albeit fruitful infinite phenomenological task is the continuous
reflection that the epoche entails. Husserl calls upon the inquirer to bracket what she knows, to

58 Fryer, p. 156.
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reflect upon and question what is known, and to break down finnly rooted knowledges. The
epoche is difficult to achieve because of the impulse to hold on to positivistic proof in science, in
history, and the testimony of others-the natural attitude. Natanson points out that "the
perfonnance of phenomenology may be described in the natural attitude, but it cannot be grasped
in that way.,,59 But the epoche is also difficult to achieve if the inquirer does not know about
what to inquire. How do we know what and to what extent to call into question about ourselves?
Foucault's analysis offers some suggestions.
With Foucault's analysis ofpower and social relations, there is a deeper explanation of
what reflection in the Husserlian epoche involves. In putting forth the notion of subjugated
knowledges and the description ofpower's role and character, Foucault further reveals and
destabilizes sedimented knowledges, a destabilization that helps elucidate what to call into
question about ourselves in the epoche.
The relational aspect of power shows that social interaction and intersubjectivity entail
power dynamics: "what is" about the world involves more than tacit agreement. While, in
Husserlian terms, we both intersubjectively know that the other endows meaning to objects and
that there may be multiple meanings given to objects, Husserl does not expand on how certain
meanings take on more significance or more value than others-the hierarchy and ordering of
meaning, of how things become "what is." There are discursive struggles for legitimacy and
nonnality. With the Foucauldian dynamic of power, power as productive and relational, it
becomes evident that even agreed upon meanings have certain albeit malleable strategies and
objectives.

59 Natanson, p. 75.
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This multiplicity of techniques and plurality of knowledge illustrate that there is a naivete
in limiting our exploration of what it means to know and to uniquely know something.
Historically, individually, and collectively, relational power and discursive battles couple and
recouple what we know, shifts that have become invisible as they discipline us and we discipline
ourselves to their normality and take their for truth about the world. From subjugated
knowledges it is apparent that some knowledges are sacrificed at the expense of others.
Subjugated knowledges point to the need to continually seek different layers of knowledge about
something: To interrogate what is seemingly natural, normal, or always there. To question what
is considered more right or more true.
Rather than operate solely Husserl's transcendental level of intersubjectivity, Foucault
illustrates the dynamic push-pull in establishing certain meanings over others. With this complex
push-pull, it is evident that are there more layers to bracket in the epoche. Through Foucauldian
aspects of power and subjected knowledges, more about what we know is called into question
and bracketed. Sedimented knowledge becomes unstuck and possibilities open up.

Husserl with Foucault: A Human-Centered Notion ofEnduring Constitutions
The subject qua agent gives a new dimension to sociopolitical interactions, knowledges,
and institutions that Foucault's explanation and Husserl's epoche together expose. The primacy
of the concrete subject points to how power relations, discourses, and the will to truth come
through the subject's constitution: as the subject's formation of the wOrld-as-world, the world as
containing discourses, politics, and truths. Notions of sex and gender as well as gender roles, for
example, come from the individual constituting the world as having these categories. But the
world becomes the world through the intersubjective, shared constitution. The world becomes the
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world-as-world as the subject in a "community of monads" lives out structures of thought, builds
institutions and ideas of the world, and exchanges and shares this information with others. These
institutions, discourses, and norms are enduring constitutions from the dynamics of sociopolitical
relations, the effects of power relations and the inter-constituting subjective world. Constituting
in an intersubjective world entails power relations; not a oppressor-oppressed dualism, but power
based on discursive battles and social interactions. This inter-tangling of power, ideas,
constitutions, and a plurality of intending consciousness yields a complexity of the world and of
the subject beyond our wildest imagination.
From this Husserl-Foucauldian perspective, a focus on the complex active-centered
subject emerges. Foucault's genealogy grounds individuals in the sociopolitical world, how we
are concretely in an intersubjective world rather than focusing on how we are supposed to be.
Husserl points to the primacy of the meaning-endowing transcendental yet concrete ego, not a
metaphysical or ideal ego. Combining hermeneutic and existential, concrete dimensions of being
in the world, Foucault's tum to the active subject and Husserl's intended consciousness returns
the inquirer to the nuclear source ofhislher activity. Husserl grounds the inquiry60 in the primacy
of the active subject while Foucault explains sociopolitical dynamics at work within this
subjectivity. Together, there is a recognition of the intersubjective power dynamics at work and
enduring constitutions that result from this intersubjectivity. But this query also leaves the human
at the center and stimulates persistent critical inquiry into sedimented layers of knowledge.
The desedimenting of knowledge about the world, a combination of the Husserlian
epoche and the Foucauldian genealogy of power relations and subjugated knowledges, applies to
anyone wanting answers to understanding the subject and the intersubjective world in which she

60 Natanson, p.54
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is enmeshed while realizing that unambiguous answers are not necessarily guaranteed. Husserl
remarks, "In short, we carry out an epoche in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims
and activities belong to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of
[this kind of] knowledge.,,61 We inquire because we are interested in what the subject has to say
about her being in the world and experiencing the world, complete with sociopolitical
dimensions.
Our query about the human and her understanding of the world is objectivity from and
for subjectivity. This recognition of the active subject does not try to universalize experience nor
give a metaphysical property to the subject; rather, it points to the transcendental constituting ego
in order to avoid Foucault's impossibility in explaining discursive struggles from a constituted
ego. The world-as-meant is revealed: how subjects give meaning to the world-as-world and the
objects in it as well as what meanings they give. These meanin~ may be shared or unique to
each individual. The focus on de-sedimentation keeps the dynamism of these meanings while
also pointing to the continuous and infinite task of the inquiry.
In the continual inquiry, there is also a new tenet: Embrace the ambiguity and live in the
tension ofthis ambiguity. While there are certain invariant structures in the life-world, there are
many variances in how or why the subject gives meaning to the world. In the inquiry, there is
also not a final, ultimate arrival point for the inquiry other than the specific inquiry at a given
moment. Rather than accepting the world on a straightforward acceptance or habitual manner
and rather than stopping the inquiry at a discursive level, there is an inquiry into these
experiences themselves and the manner in which they bestow sense. This move for a recognition
of a complex, active subject in sociopolitical relations is neither "a skeptical nor a refusal of all

61 Husserl, Crisis, p. 135. (Translator's [additions])
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verified truth,,62 nor does it "deny or relinquish the empirical.,,63 Instead, it demands that
empirical and verified truth not rely on a "found" world in its approach to the subject.
Rather than repeating past sociological approaches to social interaction, as well as other
academic disciplines about the human that rely on the strictly empirical, "found" world that
undermines the activity ofthe subject, this new approach moves for certain characteristics of
subjectivity that need to be taken into account in future sociological methods as well as projects
within, between, and across academic disciplines of the human and about the human. 64 It centers
on the active, meaning-endowing subject: the knower and the knowing are no longer divorced
and meaning does not remain stagnant or fixed to a certain individual, institution, or group. This
new way of understanding the subject points to certain attributes of the subject: the intentionality
of her consciousness, her constant endowment of meaning to the world, her shared and enduring
constitutions, her acknowledgement of others in the world, and the political push-pull in her
interactions and bestowment ofmeaning on the world. Simultaneously, this approach to
understanding the subject is engaged.

65

It gets into the grit ofliving, of the subject continually

endowing and shifting meaning in the midst of a complex world and complex interactions. This
approach constantly interrogates the notions of what is perceived as "there," as an a priori truth
or as a positivistic notion, so as not to fall back on the taken-for-granted, sedimented notions of
the world and of the subject of which Husserl and Foucault both warn us. Husserl and Foucault
in tandem points to a methodology that has a commitment to a process of unfolding and of

62 Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 781.
63 Natanson, p. 185.
64 That is, other regional ontologies, each with their own theme and place (Phenomenology
Roundtable 2)
65 An engagement rather than an application because application implies also that it can also be
not applied or unapplied and hence distant from its connection to its intended-ness.
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becoming rather than pointing to an ultimate, terminating end or an arrival point in the inquiry. 66
With the symbiosis of HusserI and Foucault arises:
An action-centered humanism:
An infinite task

A constant becoming.

A caution against invoking progress: Progress implies an end to strive for, a destination point,
an ultimate arrival. Progress in this fashion would re-invoke the positive notion that there is a
final resting point. In avoiding words such as complete or comprehensive in describing this
project for an active subject, I hope to avoid the insistence or the possibility of finding an
ultimate or found truth as well as to avoid making a metaphysical claim on the essence of an
individual.
66
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